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Siponen and Klaarvuniemi’s paper (henceforth S&K) is 
interesting and useful in correcting many misunderstand-
ings about the nature of natural science (NS) and its relation 
to social science. I do not find much to disagree with in the 
main content of the paper but I would like to make some 
consequential points about, or following on from, its argu-
ments. These are, first, that in fact much of this is not new, 
and it is a shame that the authors do not acknowledge this 
prior work. In particular, I will discuss the work of Roy 
Bhaskar, known as critical realism (CR), which has already 
been well taken up within IS. Second, the authors provide a 
good critique of the existing situation but they do not really 
put forward a substantive alternative approach. The starting 
point for such an approach can again be found in the work 
of Bhaskar and particularly the ‘mechanisms’-based view 
of scientific explanation.
The first section of the paper will outline S&K’s pri-
mary arguments. The second section will show that much 
of this has already been proposed (more comprehensively) 
by Bhaskar. The third section will consider the extension 
to social science and the fourth section will outline the 
mechanisms approach to scientific understanding.
S&K’s argument
We may very crudely summarise S&K’s arguments as 
follows:
1. There is a view within IS that for research to be 
valid, it should aspire to the natural science model 
(positivism), although there is an alternative view 
that social science is significantly different to natu-
ral science (interpretivism) and should have quite a 
separate methodology.
2. There is a common characterisation of the NS 
model, each element of which does not in fact nec-
essarily apply in natural science:
2.1. Generally, a quantitative/statistical/mathemati-
cal approach is required but,
- The distinction between quantitative and 
qualitative is itself problematic.
- Much natural science, for example, biology, 
is in fact observational and qualitative.
- Little NS is actually statistical and many 
NS phenomena do not fit with mathemati-
cal models.
2.2. It is based on objective, observer-independent 
observations and theories that can be proved to 
be true but,
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- Scientists are not independent but often 
intervene in their experiments.
- There is no objective observation, every-
thing is theory-laded.
- NS is fundamentally hermeneutic – obser-
vations have to be interpreted. Science is 
therefore cultural and historical.
- It is not possible to prove theories true and 
there are many ‘unreal’ concepts such as 
ideal gases.
2.3. It aims to discover universal laws, based on 
a deterministic world and laboratory experi-
ments but,
- Almost no true universal laws have been 
identified; it is better to look for 
mechanisms.
- Generally the world is not deterministic, 
see, for example, quantum effects.
- Lab results often do not transfer because 
the real world is multi-causal.
3. The conclusions are that IS should not follow a mis-
taken view of natural science, and that, in any case, 
there is no single model of natural science that cov-
ers all its domains.
CR and natural science
Bhaskar’s (1978) first book, titled A Realist Theory of 
Science, was a sustained critique of the positivist view of 
natural science, and his second (Bhaskar, 1979), The 
Possibility of Naturalism,1 considered the social sciences 
and proposed that there could be a single approach to sci-
ence across both domains although the special nature of the 
social world meant that the approach must be modified in 
various ways. This philosophy, currently known as ‘critical 
realism’, has been taken up in IS to a significant degree 
(Aaltonen and Tempini, 2014; Bygstad et al., 2016; Carlsson, 
2010; Mingers, 2004a, 2004b; Mingers et al., 2013; Mingers 
and Standing, 2017; Smith, 2006; Volkoff and Strong, 2013; 
Williams and Karahanna, 2013; Williams and Wynn, 2018; 
Wynn and Williams, 2012, 2020; Zachariadis et al., 2013).
For CR, any science consists of two domains – the tran-
sitive and the intransitive. The transitive domain consists of 
all the human activities involved in science – experiments, 
observations, theories, data, papers, grants, etc. The transi-
tive domain recognises that science is essentially a human 
activity. Conversely, the intransitive domain consists of the 
objects of knowledge, the structures or processes about 
which we observe or theorise. These objects are independ-
ent of the way we may conceptualise them at any particular 
time. They are nevertheless real and objective even though 
we cannot access them directly. This allows CR to accept 
epistemic relativity, that is that we cannot make pure, 
unmediated observations – they are always perceptually, 
linguistically and theoretically constrained. Our knowledge 
is always culturally and historically relative; and knowl-
edge is always essentially fallible – that is, cannot be proven 
to be true. It does not mean that we have to accept judge-
mental relativity – that is, that all views are equally valid 
and we cannot choose between them. These arguments 
cover the points made in 2.2 above.
CR also rejects the idea that science should be about the 
search for general, universal laws, and the Humean view of 
causation as constant conjunctions of events which under-
pins most statistical methods, for example, regression. 
Constant conjunctions of events are extremely rare in the 
real world, and in fact, it is the purpose of laboratory exper-
iments to bring them about. The real world is intrinsically 
open with many multi-causal factors generating actual 
events. CR distinguishes between the Real domain of inter-
acting causal mechanisms with their particular powers 
(affordances and liabilities); the Actual domain of events 
that result from the interacting mechanisms; and the 
Empirical domain – the subset of events that we actually 
observe of record. These arguments cover the points made 
in 2.3 and 2.1 above.
CR and social science
The main conclusions of S&K’s paper are that IS should 
not follow a mistaken model of natural science and that, in 
any case, no one model of NS would fit its many different 
fields. However, they do little to propose a positive model 
for IS research.
In contrast, Bhaskar (1979) proposes a very general 
methodology based on ‘retroduction’2 that can be applied 
across the physical sciences and, with some modifications, 
across social science as well. It is essentially qualitative 
although will use quantitative data where appropriate; it 
aims for explanation not prediction; it focusses on mecha-
nisms rather than general laws; it recognises the hermeneu-
tic nature of observation; and it accepts that we can rarely 
know that we have a true theory, although truth is an ideal 
(Mingers and Standing, 2020).
We take some unexplained phenomenon that has been 
observed (albeit not objectively) and propose hypothetical 
mechanisms or structures which, if they existed, would gen-
erate or cause, through their properties, that which is to be 
explained. The mechanisms may be physical, social, cogni-
tive or ideational. So, we move from experiences in the 
Empirical domain to events in the Actual domain through 
to possible structures or mechanisms in the Real domain. 
Such hypotheses do not of themselves prove that the mech-
anism exists, and we may have competing explanations in 
terms of other mechanisms, so the next step is to work 
towards eliminating some explanations and supporting oth-
ers. Finally, this leads to a correction of previous results or 
theories. Bhaskar (1994) summarises this as Description, 
Retroduction, Elimination, Identification and Correction 
(DREIC) (p. 24).
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This approach can be applied equally within social sci-
ence but we must recognise that the social world is intrinsi-
cally different to the material world and this places limits on 
the methodology (Mingers, 2004b) in the following ways:
 • Ontological
1. Social structures do not exist independently of 
the activities they govern; they exist only in 
their effects or occurrences. Social structures 
enable social activities but may thereby be 
themselves transformed.
2. Social structures do not exist independently of 
the agents’ conceptions of what they are doing. 
In contrast, natural phenomena are independent 
of our conceptions of them.
3. Social structures are localised in both space and 
time.
 • Epistemological
1. Social systems are inherently interactive and 
open and generally cannot be artificially closed 
in the laboratory. People are self-reflexive and 
can choose how to define a situation.
2. The possibilities of measurement are very lim-
ited since intrinsically the phenomena are mean-
ingful, and meanings cannot properly be 
measured and compared, only understood and 
described.
 • Relational
1. Social science is itself a social practice and is, 
therefore, inherently self-referential. Social 
knowledge can change the nature of the social 
world.
Conclusion: towards the future
S&K are right to point out the problems of the traditional 
model of natural science and that therefore it should not 
be seen as a guiding light within IS. But, in fact, within 
the philosophy of natural science itself, there has been a 
move away from the traditional deductive-nomological 
(D-N) model of Hempel (1965), which suffers from many 
of the faults described above, towards an approach based 
on the idea of causal mechanisms (Mingers, 2014, Ch. 4). 
This has been especially so in an area like biology 
(Bechtel and Abrahamsen, 2005; Craver, 2009; Glennan, 
1996, 2002; Illari, 2013; Illari and Williamson, 2011; 
Machamer, 2004; Machamer et al., 2000; Salmon, 1998).
The causal mechanisms approach has also been utilised 
within the social sciences (Astbury and Leeuw, 2010; 
Hedström and Swedberg, 1996; Mayntz, 2004; Reiss, 2007) 
and even within IS (Avgerou, 2013; Bygstad, 2010; 
Henfridsson and Bygstad, 2013; Mingers and Standing, 
2017). I believe that it has the potential to go beyond the 
current impasse between positivism and interpretivism.
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Notes
1. ‘Naturalism’ is the view that there should be a common sci-
entific method across both natural and social science.
2. Called ‘abduction’ by Peirce (1907).
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